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Brussels is no stranger to political confusion, especially when the leadership of the EU institutions is
concerned. Already the press wheels out its usual reports of backroom deals and an imminent 'stitch-up'
between party bosses for the election of the next president of the European Parliament, which takes place
next Tuesday (17 January) in Strasbourg. The truth is much more democratic and therefore complicated. So,
by way of a public good, here's my contribution to the debate: first, I will deal with the Parliament's rules
for the election; then I will talk about what may motivate MEPs to vote for whom; lastly, I will ask whether
this election matters very much at all.
The rules
In the first three rounds of the election, somebody is elected by obtaining an absolute majority of the valid
votes cast – in other words, the winning candidate needs more than the combined votes of all the other
candidates. At the equivalent moment five years ago, for example, Martin Schulz was elected on the first ballot
with 387 votes (including mine) against two other candidates whose combined total was 283. 29 votes were
invalid and 52 MEPs did not vote at all. So abstentions and spoiled ballots do matter, although not as much as
a real vote. MEPs will cast a secret ballot, as the rules prescribe, which limits the power of their political groups
and parties to influence their choice. Only the names of all those who voted are later published. 
This time there are many more candidates and much less consensus than in 2012, so it is very unlikely that
anyone will emerge victorious from the first three rounds of voting. Although candidates may drop out at
any stage of the process – and the most marginal probably will – there is nothing in the rules to insist that
they do. Nor is there anything to prevent new candidates being nominated before the second or third
rounds. To secure a nomination a candidate needs the support of a political group or at least 40 MEPs.
In the fourth and final round of voting, however, only the top two candidates go forward and secure election
by a simple majority of valid votes cast (not, please note, by an absolute majority of the House).
The candidates
So far there are eight candidates declared, as follows:
The conservative group of the European People's Party has nominated Antonio Tajani (63). He is the best
dressed of the candidates, but comes from the stable of Silvio Berlusconi which is not an obvious advantage;
2he also carries a mixed reputation as a former Commissioner. He won an internal contest within the EPP
group against the veteran French notable Alain Lamassoure, former Slovenian Prime Minister Alojz Peterlee
and the respected Irish Vice-President of the Parliament Mairead McGuiness. Although the EPP group can
be commended for holding a proper primary election, not all the EPP's 217 MEPs will vote for Tajani.
Gianni Pittella (58) is the candidate of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D). He sports
classy spectacles and is well-liked, although in his current role as S&D group leader he has not always cut
a commanding figure. Pittella comes from the party of Matteo Renzi, an acquired taste. Pittella had no rival
for the socialist nomination, and most of the 189 S&D MEPs will back him. 
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has nominated its leader Guy Verhofstadt (63),
arguably the best parliamentarian in the House and a former long-standing prime minister of Belgium. He
led for the Liberals in the 2014 election and is the Parliament's chief negotiator on Brexit. He is a
controversial figure, not least for his advanced federalist views, but his only rival for the nomination within
the ALDE group was Sylvie Goulard, also a federalist fidèle. ALDE has 68 MEPs.
Verhofstadt's emergence in the first round is a bit of a surprise: he might have been wiser to wait until the
third before stepping in as a compromise candidate to break a deadlock once the relative unpopularity of
Tajani and Pittella had been exposed. We will see.
The communist European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE), with 52 MEPs, have nominated yet
another Italian, Eleonora Forenza. Pittella needs badly to pick up her supporters.
Jean Lambert is the candidate of the Greens/European Free Alliance, with 50 fairly lively members. She is
well-respected and as the only Brit in the race, something of a curiosity. Verhofstadt will be plugging hard
for Green votes in later rounds.
The eurosceptic group of European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which was founded by the now
disgraced David Cameron, has put forward a lesser-known Belgian, Helga Stevens. The group has 74 MEPs,
several of whom might switch to support Tajani.
Nigel Farage's motley group, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), has nominated a young
Neopolitan called Piernicola Pedicini, a follower of Beppe Grillo. He can expect few votes even from his
own group, nominally 44 strong.
The Europe of Nations and Freedom (EFN) group of Marine Le Pen (39 MEPs) has presented its candidate.
He is Laurentiu Rebega, a Romanian.
The campaign
Every two and a half years, the election contest for the presidency of the House provokes debate about
where the institution is headed, both externally and internally. Martin Schulz, uniquely having served 
two terms of office, has certainly enlarged the profile of the European Parliament. He has not led a very
convincing reformist movement, however, and the Parliament has entirely failed to capitalise on 
the Spitzenkandidat experiment of 2014, which propelled Jean-Claude Juncker into the presidency of the
Commission, Schulz himself into the Parliament's top seat and Verhofstadt to greater prominence. There 
has been no serious push, for example, towards the introduction of a pan-European constituency for the
2019 elections in which a number of MEPs would be elected from transnational lists. The Parliament 
has not emerged as a leading strategic player in response to the major crises which have afflicted and still
afflict the Union. The Parliament has concentrated on putting in place the first laws of banking union, 
but the legislative agenda in general has slowed. Enlargement is off the table and constitutional reform 
has stalled. 
Of the three who have any realistic chance of winning the prize, Verhofstadt has the most progressive and
coherent agenda to re-launch Europe. He argues that he is the man "with a proven ability to lead a broad
coalition and who can unite the pro-European forces in this house". He would be the first Liberal president
since Pat Cox in 2002 and the first Belgian since 1965.
Tajani or Pittella would be the first Italian president of the House since Emilio Colombo in 1977. Antonio
Tajani is a pro-European of relentlessly conservative inclinations, fearing to make Europe's political crisis
worse by antagonising eurosceptical public opinion. 
Gianni Pittella hopes to pick up support by attacking the politics of austerity. Moreover, he is trying furiously
to distance himself from the cosy coalition between the S&D and the EPP which has supposedly been
running the Parliament for the last few years, mirroring the Grosse Koalition in Berlin. For good or ill, this
pact has prospered under the aegis of Schulz and EPP leader Manfred Weber, Juncker's Chef de Cabinet
Martin Selmayr and Parliament's Secretary-General, Klaus Welle. Pittella's problem is that Verhofstadt is the
much more credible slayer of this German-led Christian Democrat/Social Democrat fudge, not having been
implicated in it himself (sometimes, it must be owned, to his own evident frustration).
What will shift the votes of MEPs? Nationality does not really matter in this context – at least for the vast
majority of MEPs who easily fit into Europe's classic partisan spectrum. Indeed, it would be counter-intuitive
to favour a candidate who was a fellow-countryman but from a rival political camp. And with four Italian
candidates, being Italian will help none of them. A sense of 'fair turns' would scupper the chances of another
German from winning the crown (even among Germans MEPs). In certain circumstances, MEPs could be
influenced by regional instinct to vote across party boundaries – for example, by supporting a fellow
Scandinavian or Central European – but the absence of either breed from the contest this time is striking.
Similarly, gender could and should be a factor, but with the three women candidates destined to come low
in the political ranking, it cannot be so this time. There is no black or ethnic minority candidate.
So the predominant influence will be that of party affiliation, in spite of the fact that group cohesion,
especially in the EPP and ALDE is unreliable. In a House whose raison d'être is the European project,
degrees of support for further European integration is a significant factor. Strong nationalists will never vote
for strong federalists, and vice versa. But as no nationalist candidate can win, it is the mildly 'pro-European'
Tajani, in contradistinction to Pittella or Verhofstadt, who can pick up eurosceptic votes in later rounds.
Tajani's dilemma is that to secure victory he knows he cannot rely only on right-wing MEPs, and must not
lose the backing of pro-European Christian Democrats; but the more centrist Tajani purports to be, the more
he will shed the support of eurosceptics.
And it is Verhofstadt, not Tajani who can hope to recruit the unconventional votes of the 17 Grillini as and
when Pedicini leaves the stage. At the time of writing the Five Star Movement is considering jumping ship
from the EFDD to ALDE, in a move that would signal their introduction to mainstream European politics.
In any case, expect a substantial abstention in the later ballots from the forces of the traditional far-right,
most of which loathe the EPP.
As to policies, it will be the candidate who can best articulate a new economic policy that could turn votes,
especially among serious-minded Germans, Dutch and Scandinavian MEPs from the European People's
Party who are critical of Italy's economic record and are drawn to admire Verhofstadt's stringent attacks on
the economic performance of the Commission and European Council. The presumed and variable personal
probity of the candidates also matters to these Nordic types.
There will be much manoeuvring this week to find the candidate from the centre-left who can beat Tajani
in the fourth ballot. Wise pundits expect the list of candidates to either lengthen or shorten before voting
starts next Tuesday.
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On the face of it, as things stand, Antonio Tajani is the favourite. If elected, all three EU institutions would
be then led by the EPP. There is much to be said against such a monopoly on top posts. Tajani's election
would surely weaken the case for the automatic re-appointment of Donald Tusk to the presidency of the
European Council in May – a re-appointment which is in any case hotly and rudely opposed by the Polish
government (whose Law & Justice MEPs belong to the ECR parliamentary group).
If Guy Verhofstadt wins this contest the logic of the 2014 experiment with Spitzenkandidaten will be
maintained, and he would be in a strong position to lead the Liberal campaign at the 2019 elections to the
European Parliament – just as President Martin Schulz did as the top candidate for the socialists in 2014.
Nobody should doubt that Verhofstadt's real ambition is to succeed Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission
president. Chairing the Parliament judiciously for a couple of years would be the best possible way to dispel
his reputation in Council circles as a firebrand. Moreover, by June 2019 Brexit will have removed the
habitual British veto of any Belgian federalist who vies for the top Commission job.
Does it matter?
Whatever happens in the race for Parliament's presidency, there will then be a shuffling of the pack in other
parliamentary posts, including the appointment of a new Brexit front-person if Verhofstadt is elevated. But
it's the top job that really matters, and who gets it is a decision that belongs uniquely to MEPs. Attempts by
national capitals to influence the outcome may back-fire. The European Council and the Commission will
simply have to adjust as best they can to their new parliamentary interlocutor.
On the wider plane, the result will be watched closely to see whether the centre-left can reorganise itself
more sensibly at the European level than it seems able to do nationally. Such a feat could have important
implications for 2019.
Another weak president of the European Parliament could do a lot of harm to the efficiency and authority of
the House. Another strong president, by building on the legacy of Schulz, should exploit the trauma of Brexit
to enhance the legitimacy of parliamentary democracy at the federal level. Preparations will begin under the
watch of the new president to make the next big steps forward in European integration. MEPs can start to build
a new consensus around the EU's reform agenda. They will have a direct say in the long overdue review of
the EU's financial system. Parliament should reinforce its efforts to shape the EU's international trade policy.
Its internal procedures must become more open and meritocratic. Both the Juncker Commission and the Tusk
European Council deserve sharper parliamentary scrutiny than has been the case under the Schulz regime. 
In a revealing last interview (Guardian, 6 January), Martin Schulz said of MEPs that: "There are three groups:
some are leading an academic discourse on the deepening of the EU, others are leading a brutal course of
destruction. Between them are a majority of realistic politicians." His successor needs to encourage the first
group and discourage the second. But the 'realistic' majority of MEPs must be cajoled into taking their
responsibilities to the European Union more seriously, being prepared to use to the full all of the Parliament's
powers of initiative and co-decision, and into recognising their duty of care for the European project, which
is in grave danger of faltering.
The European Parliament can save the Union or wreck it. Who leads it matters a lot.
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